NEGLIGENCE-PHYSICIANS

AND

SURGEONS-DUTY

IMPOSED ON

PSYCHOTHERAPISTS TO EXERCISE REASONABLE CARE TO WARN
POTENTIAL VICTIMS OF FORESEEABLY IMMINENT DANGERS POSED

BY MENTALLY ILL PATIENTS-Tarasoff v. Regents of University of
California, 13 Cal. 3d 177, 529 P.2d 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129
(1974).

On October 27, 1969, Tatiana Tarasoff was fatally stabbed by
Prosenjit Poddar, an Indian-born graduate student attending the
University of California at Berkeley.' Two months prior to the
murder, Poddar, during a psychotherapy session conducted at
the campus hospital, allegedly confided his intention to kill Miss
Tarasoff to his therapist, Dr. Moore.2 Immediately thereafter, Dr.
Moore, with the concurrence of two of the hospital's psychiatrists,
determined that Poddar was dangerous and enlisted the aid of the
campus police to escort him to a mental hospital for observation.3
Poddar was then taken into custody by the campus police and
detained for a brief period, but was released when they were
satisfied that he was rational. 4 Upon learning of the Poddar incident, Dr. Harvey Powelson, the director of the campus hospital's
psychiatric department, ordered that no further action be taken to

secure Poddar's commitment. 5 Poddar subsequently terminated the
psychiatric treatment, 6 but none of the therapists or policemen
involved took any steps to warn either Tatiana or her parents of
7
the potential danger posed by Poddar.
Following the murder, Miss Tarasoff's parents instituted a
wrongful death action against the therapists and policemen,8 as
well as their employer, the Regents of the University of California,

predicating liability upon two bases. First, the plaintiffs asserted
that the defendants failed to exercise reasonable care to have
' People v. Poddar, 10 Cal. 3d 750, 753-54, 518 P.2d 342, 344-45, 111 Cal. Rptr. 910,
912-13 (1974).
2 Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 108 Cal. Rptr. 878, 880 (Dist. Ct. App. 1973),
rev'd, 13 Cal. 3d 177, 529 P.2d 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974). Prior to publication in 33
Cal. App., a hearing was granted by the California supreme court. For this reason, the
opinion was not reported in 33 Cal. App.
3 Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 108 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
4 Id.
5Id.
' Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 13 Cal. 3d 177, -,
529 P.2d 553, 559, 118
Cal. Rptr. 129, 135 (1974).
7 Id. at-,
529 P.2d at 555, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
s Named as defendants in this action were: Dr. Moore, Poddar's therapist; Drs. Gold
and Yandell, the psychiatrists who concurred with Moore; Dr. Powelson, the head of the
hospital's department of psychiatry; the chief of the campus police; and four campus police
officers. Id. at n.2, 529 P.2d at 555, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
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Poddar committed for psychiatric evaluation. 9 Second, the plaintiffs alleged the existence of a duty on the part of the defendants to
warn them of their daughter's peril, the breach of which proximately resulted in Tatiana's death.' 0
The trial court, concluding that the plaintiffs' complaint failed
to state a cause of action, sustained the defendants' demurrer."
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the defendants were
under neither a duty to commit Poddar for evaluation nor a duty
to warn the plaintiffs of the danger he posed. 2 In Tarasoff v.
Regents of University of California,1 3 the Califoria supreme court
reversed, holding that a viable cause of action against the therapists
and their employer could be predicated upon their negligent failure to warn the intended victim of her peril.1 4 The court also held
that the defendant police officers were subject to liability for failure
to warn on the ground that their actions with respect to Poddar
' 5
"increased the risk of violence."'
Id. at

10 Id.

-

,

529 P.2d at 555, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 131.

11 Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 108 Cal. Rptr. 878, 880 (Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
12 Id. at 883, 885-87.
i3 13 Cal. 3d 177, 529 P.2d 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974).
14 Id. at
-, 529 P.2d at 555, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
The court found that the defendant therapists were not immune from liability for their
failure to warn. In arriving at this conclusion, the court focused its attention on CAL. Gov'T
CODE § 820.2 (West 1966), which insulates public employees from liability if their "'act or
omission' " causing injury " 'was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in'" them.
529 P.2d at 561-62, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 137-38 (quoting from CAL. GOV'T
13 Cal. 3d at -,
CODE § 820.2 (West 1966)).
Recognizing that discretion plays a part in nearly every act of a public official, the court
relied on Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968), in which
section 820.2 was construed as bestowing immunity only for fundamental" 'policy decisions.'"
13 Cal. 3d at -,
529 P.2d at 562, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 138 (quoting from Johnson v. State, 69
Cal. 2d 782, 793, 447 P.2d 352, 360, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 248 (1968)).
Employing the scope of immunity delineated in Johnson, the Tarasoff court indicated
that it should only be as broad as absolutely essential to permit "legislative and executive
policymakers sufficient breathing space in which to perform their vital policymaking functions." 13 Cal. 3d at -,
529 P.2d at 562, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 138. Following the guidelines
established inJohnson, the court in Tarasoff determined that the failure to issue a warning to
Miss Tarasoff was not of such a nature as to warrant the protection of section 820.2. Id. at
-,
529 P.2d at 562-63, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 138-39.
The court did conclude, however, that CAL. GOV'T CODE § 856 (West 1966), immunized
the therapists from liability for their failure to secure Poddar's confinement. Section 856
confers total immunity upon public officials for injuries caused by a "determin[ation] ...
[w]hether to confine a person for mental illness." Id. Both Dr. Powelson's order that no
further action be taken against Poddar and Dr. Moore's acquiescence in that order were
perceived by the court as falling within the ambit of section 856 and, thus, protected from
529 P.2d at 564. 118 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
liability. 13 Cal. 3d at-,
529 P.2d at 561, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 137. The court found that
15 13 Cal. 3d at-,
CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5154 (West 1972) shielded the police officers from liability for
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Although the court failed to explain its rationale for holding
the police officers liable,1 6 it found two bases on which to predicate the liability of the therapists. Of primary importance was the
existence of a psychotherapist-patient relationship which, the court
concluded, gave rise to a duty on the part of the therapists to warn
those foreseeably endangered by their patient. 7 Additionally, the
court premised the therapists' duty to warn on the fact that their
conduct leading to the termination of Poddar's treatment contributed to the danger of the decedent.18 Thus, the effect of Tarasoff
is to extend to the psychotherapist the seldom-imposed duty to
take affirmative action for the protection of others.
At common law, there was no general duty to protect or aid
another human being who was in peril.' 9 The basis of this rule was
the distinction which has been drawn between misfeasance and
nonfeasance-"active misconduct" and "passive inaction" 2 0-and
a
judicial unwillingness to subject the nonfeasor to liability. Underlying this distinction was a reluctance on the part of early courts to
become vehicles for the enforcement of moral duties.2 ' In addition, the courts were too preoccupied with more glaring types of
discharging Poddar after having him in their custody. 13 Cal. 3d at , 529 P.2d at
564-65, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 140-41. Section 5154 immunizes a "peace officer" charged with
detaining an individual at a facility offering "72-hour treatment and evaluation" from
liability for the acts of "a person released at or before the end of 72 hours." CAL. WELt. &
INST'NS CODE § 5154 (West 1972).

The court determined that since plaintiffs' complaint attributed to the campus police
the capability of performing "peace officer" functions, they should be deemed to occupy that
status within the meaning of section 5154 and thus fall within its protection. 13 Cal. 3d at
, 529 P.2d at 565, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 141.

6 justice Clark, in his dissenting opinion, criticized the majority for failing to articulate
the precise basis on which it predicated the police officers' liability. After characterizing the
discussion of the police defendants as "lost" in the majority's opinion, Justice Clark expressed fears that the expansiveness of the holding may be interpreted to mean that a duty
to warn ensued merely from Poddar's release. 13 Cal. 3d at -,
529 P.2d at 569, 118 Cal.
Rptr. at 145. Furthermore, Justice Clark asserted that one might extrapolate from the
opinion that a corresponding duty to warn of potential danger is imposed on prison officials
"whenever a prisoner is released," thus placing an insuperable burden upon peace officers.
Id.
17 Id. at , 529 P.2d at 555, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 131.

Id.
Is
'9

See W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 56, at 340 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as

PROSSER]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
20 Dean Prosser has described the distinction as one "between active misconduct work-

ing positive injury to others and passive inaction or a failure to take steps to protect them
from harm." PROSSER, supra note 19, § 56, at 338-39 (footnote omitted). See also Bohlen, The
Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability (pt. 1), 56 U. PA. L. REv. 217, 219 (1908).
21 PROSSER, supra note

19, § 56, at 339.
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misconduct to give serious consideration to acts of omission, even
22
where serious harm resulted.
As a result, liability for failing to act for the protection of
others evolved very slowly, with courts carving out exceptions to
the general rule. 23 One such exception in which courts have held
that a duty of care exists is in circumstances
in which the defendant stands in some special relationship to
either the person whose conduct needs to be controlled or in a
relationship to the foreseeable victim of that conduct ....24
Once a special relationship giving rise to a duty of care is established, 25 affirmative duties, including a duty to warn, may be imposed to prevent injury to third parties.
Illustrative of this principle, which has been applied in a
myriad of circumstances, 26 is Ellis v. D'Angelo. 2 7 In Ellis, a babysitter

instituted an action against the parents of a four-year-old child who
had caused the sitter serious injury. The court upheld the cause of
action against the parents on the ground that they had negligently
22

RESTATEMENT,

supra note 19, § 314, comment c at 116.

23 PROSSER, supra note 19, § 56, at 339.
24 Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 13 Cal. 3d 177, -,
529 P.2d 553, 557, 118
Cal. Rptr. 129, 133 (1974) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 315-20 (1965)).
A duty of care has been imposed on parties standing in particular relationships to a
source of peril. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Baltimore & P.R.R., 168 U.S. 135, 138 (1897) (master to
servant); Bieker v. Owens, 234 Ark. 97, 99, 350 S.W.2d 522, 524 (1961) (parent to child);
Beaudoin v. W.F. Mahaney, Inc., 131 Me. 118, 122, 159 A. 567, 569 (1932) (owner of an
automobile to one driving it in his presence); Connolly v. Nicollet Hotel, 254 Minn. 373, 382,
95 N.W.2d 657, 664 (1959) (operator of business establishment to those persons upon
premises); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Wood, 95 Tex. 223, 233-34, 66 S.W. 449, 451 (1902)
(custodian to dangerous ward).
In other instances, relationships to foreseeable victims have given rise to a duty of care.
See, e.g., McPherson v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 383 F.2d 527, 533 (5th Cir. 1967)
(carriers to passengers); Winn v. Holmes, 143 Cal. App. 2d 501, 505, 299 P.2d 994, 996
(1956) (owners of premises to business invitees); King v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 286 So. 2d 256, 258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 294 So. 2d 89 (1974) (school
to pupil); Fortney v. Hotel Rancroft, Inc., 5 Il1. App. 2d 327, 331, 125 N.E.2d 544, 546
(1955) (innkeepers to guests); Sylvester v. Northwestern Hosp., 236 Minn. 384, 386-90, 53
N.W.2d 17, 19-21 (1952) (hospital to patients); Taylor v. Slaughter, 171 Okla. 152, 154, 42
P.2d 235, 237 (1935) (custodian to prisoners).
25 The determination as to which special relationships warrant the imposition of a duty
of care basically represents a judicial conclusion as to what "sound social policy requires."
Harper & Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886, 886 (1934). See
also PROSSER, supra note 19, § 56, at 339. However, the criteria applied to arrive at this
determination have been bemoaned as being "so incredibly complicated as almost to defy
analysis." Harper & Kime, supra at 904.
26 See, e.g., Freese v. Lemmon, 210 N.W.2d 576, 579-80 (Iowa 1973) (physician under a
duty to warn a motorist who had suffered a seizure of the dangers in driving a car).
27 116 Cal. App. 2d 310, 253 P.2d 675 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953).
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failed to warn the babysitter of their child's propensity for furiously
attacking people.2" The court emphasized that a parent who is
cognizant of the potential danger posed by his child must use
reasonable care to control the child, thereby minimizing the harm
he may cause. 2 9 Clearly, the duty to warn forseeable victims of the
child's dangerous proclivities emanated from the parents' duty to
control their child.
A second area in which courts have departed from the
common law principle that no one is under a duty to protect
another has been found in situations in which the defendant has
acted either to control a person's conduct or to protect the intended victim. 30 The underlying basis for subjecting one who acts
affirmatively to liability is that once a person undertakes "to render
service, he must employ reasonable care," which may include warning potential victims. 3 1 Thus, in Morgan v. County of Yuba, 32 the
court held that a sheriff who had elicited the reliance of a woman
by promising to warn her of the release of an individual who had
threatened to kill her, owed a duty to give that warning, the
violation of which was a basis for liability. 33 Similarly, in Johnson v.
State,3 4 the defendant's affirmative conduct in placing a foster
child in the plaintiff's home gave rise to a duty to warn the plaintiff of the young man's dangerous qualities.3 5
The California supreme court concluded that both of these
exceptions were applicable to the facts in Tarasoff3 6 In first determining that the special relationship between the psychotherapists
and their patient, Poddar, was sufficient to establish a duty on the
part of the therapists to warn those foreseeably endangered by
Poddar, the court relied on a number of cases in which it had been
recognized that a doctor-patient relationship may give rise to
affirmative duties. 3 7 For example, in Wojcik v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 38 the court held that a tubercular employee, as well as his
wife, could maintain a cause of action against the husband's
28 Id. at 317, 253 P.2d at 679.

29 Id. at 317-20, 253 P.2d at 679-80.
30 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, §§ 321-24A. See also PROSSER, supra note 19, § 56, at

343-44.

31 13 Cal. 3d at -,
529 P.2d at 559, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
32 230 Cal. App. 2d 938, 41 Cal. Rptr. 508 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
33 Id. at 941, 944-46, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 510, 512-13.
34 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968).
35 Id. at 785-86, 447 P.2d at 355, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
36 13 Cal. 3d at-,
529 P.2d at 557, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
31 Id. at -,
529 P.2d at 558-59, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 134-35.
38 18 Misc. 2d 740, 183 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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employer for failing to warn of the contagious disease, after it had
39
been diagnosed by physicians serving as agents of the defendant.
Similarly, in Kaiser v. Suburban Transportation System, 4" the court
sustained a cause of action instituted by an injured bus passenger
against a doctor who allegedly had failed to warn his patient, the
bus driver, of the possible side effects of a prescribed drug.4
Together, these cases serve to illustrate that a doctor may be liable
not only for a failure to warn his patient of the particular dangers
resulting from an illness, but also for the failure to alert third
parties foreseeably endangered by the patient.
The Tarasoff court could find no logical reason for restricting
the imposition of a duty to warn to a doctor treating physical
ailments, and
conclude[d] that a doctor or a psychotherapist treating a mentally ill patient . . .bears a duty to use reasonable care to give
threatened persons such warnings as are essential to avert
foreseeable
danger arising from his patient's condition or treat42
ment.
In determining that the second exception-that an affirmative
act of a defendant may give rise to a duty to warn-was applicable,
the court focused on the relationship between the defendants'
conduct in treating Poddar and his subsequent discontinuance of
psychotherapy. 43 The court perceived a correlation between the
"defendants' bungled attempt" at having Poddar committed for
evaluation and Poddar's termination of treatment, which, if continued, may have dissuaded him from killing Miss Tarasoff.4 4
Thus, the court found that the defendants, having aggravated the
victim's position of danger, were under a duty to issue a warning. 4 5
The defendant therapists advanced two policy considerations
to support the view that the duty to warn endangered third parties
should not be imposed upon a psychotherapist. 4 6 First, they asserted that patients undergoing therapy are encouraged to express
all hostile and violent thoughts, and that very few patients carry
39 Id. at 743-47, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 355-59. See also Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752,
753 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (physician's negligent failure to diagnose contagious disease of
father deemed to have violated a duty to warn child who later contracted the disease).
40 65 Wash. 2d 461, 398 P.2d 14, modified, 401 P.2d 350 (1965).
4' 65 Wash. 2d at 464, 398 P.2d at 16.
42 13 Cal. 3d at -,
529 P.2d at 559, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 135.

43 Id.

"I Id. at-,
41 Id. at -,
46 Id. at-,

529 P.2d at 555, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
529 P.2d at 559, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
529 P.2d at 559-60, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 135-36.
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their threats to fruition.4 7 Additionally, the defendants argued that
since the harm to the patient resulting from disclosure could be
quite acute, the psychotherapist is put in the difficult position of.
having to determine which patients are apt to carry out their
expressed aggressions, and then weigh this against the detrimental
effects which a warning would likely precipitate. 48 Since this is an
extremely delicate decision, requiring a high degree of professional
skill and judgment, the defendants maintained that it should not
provide the basis for any future liability.4 9 Second, the therapists
contended that the imposition of a duty to warn would be incompatible with effective treatment, inasmuch as psychotherapy requires full and complete disclosure on the part of the patient,
which will only be forthcoming if the confidentiality of communica50
tions is maintained.
In addressing the first of these arguments, the court indicated
that the determination required of the therapist was no more
demanding than that which other professionals are called upon to
make. 5 ' Furthermore, the standard of conduct to which the
therapist would be held-that degree of skill ordinarily exercised
by therapists under like circumstances-takes account of judgmental differences. 52 Consequently, the court concluded that
neither the therapists' difficulties in making professional judgments nor the court's difficulties in assessing such determinations
warranted exempting the therapists from liability. 5 3
47 Id. at -,
48 Id.

529 P.2d at 560, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 136.

49 Id. Psychiatrists are already faced with potential liability arising out of errors in
judgment. For example, a faulty determination that a minor is either in need of emergency
psychiatric treatment or sufficiently emancipated to be capable of consenting to treatment could
give rise to legal liability. Rosenberg, The Right to a Sound Mind, 10 TRIAL 36, 40 (May/June
1974).
5' 13 Cal. 3d at -,
529 P.2d at 560, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
51 Id. A physician is under both an ethical and a legal duty not to divulge the confidences of his patient. See Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNE
L. REv. 175, 175 (1960); Note, Confidential Communications-A Physician Is Under a General
Duty Not To Disclose Information Obtained in the Course of a Doctor-PatientRelationship, 26 ALA. L.
REV. 485, 487 (1974). Yet, in many circumstances society imposes upon him the obligation of
determining when this duty to his patient is overridden by greater societal interests. For
example, some states require a physician to report instances of apparent child abuse. See,
e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.5 (West Supp. 1975); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 772,571 (1968).
See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10 (Supp. 1975-76) (applicable to any person). Many
jurisdictions also require a doctor to report all injuries which appear to be the result of specified
unlawful conduct. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161 (West 1970); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1762
(Supp. 1971-72).
52 13 Cal. 3d at -,
529 P.2d at 560, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
53 Id.
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The court treated the second policy consideration rather
summarily. While recognizing the important stake which society
has in effectively treating the mentally ill and the role that confidentiality plays in effective therapy, the court pointed out that these
considerations must be balanced against the interest of public safety. 4 However, having identified the competing concerns, the court
eschewed any detailed analysis of their respective merits. Rather, the
court looked to the state's evidence code to ascertain how the
competing interests should be balanced. It first noted that a state
statute established a broad psychotherapist-patient testimonial
privilege, 55 but that an exception to this privilege was created for
those instances where the mental patient is determined by the
therapist to be dangerous . 6 The Tarasoff court gleaned from these
statutes a legislative determination that society's interest in the safety
of potential victims outweighs the patient's interest in confidentiality,
57
thereby justifying the imposition of a duty to warn.
In refuting the defendants' assertions, the court not only gave
cursory treatment to the arguments advanced, but also failed to
undertake any in-depth analysis of other policy considerations relevant to the issue. More specifically, the court neglected to
examine the peculiar needs of the psychotherapist-patient relationship and the wide-reaching effects which the imposition of a duty
to warn would likely generate. Since the imposition of a duty in
tort law represents a conclusion as to what sound social policy
requires, 58 the wisdom of the court's determination can only be
54

Id. at

55

Id.

529 P.2d at 560-61, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 136-37.
529 P.2d at 560, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 136. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 1014 (West
1966). A testimonial privilege is an exception to the general duty to divulge what one knows.
8J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192, at 70 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). It grants a legal right to
withhold communications while on the witness stand. Goldstein & Katz, Psychiatrist-Patient
Privilege: The GAP Proposal and the Connecticut Statute, 36 CONN. B.J. 175, 176 (1962);
Slovenko, supra note 51, at 176. In a majority of states, the communications between a
psychotherapist and his patient fall within the scope of the physician-patient testimonial
privilege. Goldstein & Katz, supra at 179-80. However, a number of states have enacted
privilege statutes expressly covering the psychotherapist-patient relationship. See, e.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146c, d (Supp. 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1974).
-6
13 Cal. 3d at , 529 P.2d at 560-61, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 136-37. CAL. EviD. CODE
§ 1024 (West 1966) provides that the psychotherapist-patient privilege is abrogated
if the psychotherapist has reasonable cause to believe that the patient is . . .
dangerous to himself or to the person or property of another and that disclosure of
the communication is necessary to prevent the threatened danger.
11 13 Cal. 3d at -,
529 P.2d at 560-61, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 136-37.
58 In the words of Dean Prosser,
"duty" is . . . an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which
lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.
PROSSER, supra note 19, § 53, at 325-26.
at -,

,
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evaluated by weighing the competing interests involved and looking at the probable consequences which will result.
The starting point in such an evaluation must focus on the role
which confidentiality plays in effective treatment. It has been
widely asserted and accepted that complete patient disclosure is the
sine qua non of psychotherapy, 59 and that such disclosure will not
60
be forthcoming unless the patient is assured of confidentiality.
This inordinate need for confidentiality has not gone without judicial recognition. In Taylor v. United States, 61 the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in disallowing the testimony of a psychiatrist who had treated the criminal defendant,
stated that
[miany physical ailments might be treated with some degree of
effectiveness by a doctor whom the patient did not trust, but a
psychiatrist
must have his patient's confidence or he cannot help
62
him.

The California supreme court embraced this view in the much
publicized case of In re Lifschutz, 63 where it acknowledged in dictum
11 Fisher, The Psychotherapeutic Professions and the Law of Privileged Communications, 10
supra note 51, at 184-85.
World: Part 1I, 41 MINN. L. REV. 731,

WAYNE L. REV. 609, 619 (1964). See also Slovenko,
60 See Louisell, The Psychologist in Today's Legal

744-45 (1957). Cf Slawson, Patient-LitigantException: A Hazard to Psychotherapy, 21 ARCHIVES
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 347, 347-51 (1969).
Emotionally maladjusted persons often come to the therapist replete with suspicion,
insecurity, and fears of betrayal. Cross, Privileged Communications Between Participantsin Group
Psychotherapy, 1970 LAw & Soc. ORDER 191, 198. See also Heller, Some Comments to the Lawyer
on the Practice of Psychiatry, 30 TEMPLE L.Q. 401, 401 (1957). A relationship of trust must
therefore be established between the therapist and patient or the latter may, consciously or
unconsciously, refrain from telling all. See Guttmacher & Weihofen, Privileged Communications between Psychiatristand Patient, 28 IND. L.J. 32, 44 (1952); Heller, supra at 405. See also
Note, Psychiatrist-PatientPrivilege-A Need for the Retention of the Future Crime Exception, 52
IOWA L. REv. 1170, 1178 (1967).
61 222 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
02 Id. at 401-02. See also Browne v. Brooke, 236 F.2d 686, 688-89 (D.C. Cir. 1956)
(Bazelon, J., dissenting); State v. Sullivan, 60 Wash. 2d 214,225-26, 373 P.2d 474,480 (1962).
63 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970). InLifschutz, a psychiatrist, who
had been held in contempt of court for refusing to divulge information pertaining to his
treatment of a patient, applied for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain his release. Id. at 420,
467 P.2d at 559, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 831. His patient had brought a suit for assault in which he
alleged emotional and mental injury. The defendant subsequently sought to discover information concerning Dr. Lifschutz's prior treatment of the plaintiff. The trial court, determining that the psychotherapist-patient statutory privilege did not apply because the patient
himself had put the question of his emotional condition in issue, ordered the doctor to
cooperate. When Dr. Lifschutz refused to comply, the court held him in contempt. Id. at 420-21,
467 P.2d at 559-60, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 831-32.
For a discussion of the publicity generated by this case see Slovenko, PsychotherapistPatient Testimonial Privilege: A Picture of Misguided Hope, 23 CATH. U.L. REV. 649, 656-57
(1974).
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"that an environment of confidentiality of treatment is vitally important to the successful operation of psychotherapy."" In addition, legislative recognition of the essential need for confidentiality in psychotherapy is evidenced by the number of special
psychotherapist-patient privilege statutes that have been enacted. 65 In particular, the California legislature, in creating a
psychotherapist-patient testimonial privilege much broader than
that covering the physician-patient relationship, 6 6 made it quite
clear that the desire to maintain confidentiality was its prime consideration:
Psychoanalysis and psychotherapy are dependent upon the fullest
revelation of the most intimate and embarrassing details of the
patient's life. Research on mental or emotional problems requires
similar disclosure. Unless a patient or research subject is assured
that such information can and will be held in utmost confidence, he
will be reluctant to make the full disclosure upon which diagnosis
67
and treatment or complete and accurate research depends.
Given, then, this central role which confidentiality plays within
psychotherapy, what are the likely effects of the imposition of a
duty to warn?
In his dissent in Tarasoff, Justice Clark predicted that the
majority's decision "will cripple the use and effectiveness of
psychiatry. '68 With this opinion, the overwhelming number of
psychotherapists would be in complete accord. 69 They view the
inability to assure patients of complete confidentiality as likely to
both deter mentally ill persons from seeking treatment and inhibit
those already in therapy from making the complete disclosure
necessary for effective treatment. 70 One basis for this view is that a
64 2 Cal. 3d at 422, 467 P.2d at 560-61, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 832-33.
" See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1014 (West 1966); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146c, d
(Supp. 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.242 (Supp. 1974-75); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-418 (1974);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.215

(1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 13A (1971).
6 Compare CAL. EvID. CODE § 1010 et seq. (West 1966) with id. § 990 et seq. See also
Fleming & Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's Dilemma, 62 CALIF. L. REv.
1025, 1032 (1974).
e CAL. EVID. CODE § 1014, Comment (West 1966).
13 Cal. 3d at-,
529 P.2d at 567, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
9 Goldstein & Katz, supra note 55, at 178. See, e.g., Love & Yanity, Psychotherapy and the
Law, 20 MED. TRIAL TECHNIQUE Q. 405, 425 (1974).
o See Goldstein & Katz, supra note 55, at 179; Slawson, supra note 60, at 351; Slovenko,
supra note 51, at 187-88. See also Cross, supra note 60, at 201; Heller, supra note 60, at 406.
A survey conducted by the Yale Law Journal, indicating that laymen would likely be
deterred from making full disclosure to therapists if confidentiality could not be guaranteed,
attests to the inhibiting effects that may follow. Comment, Functional Overlap Between the
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patient would fear that divulgence either of the fact that he is
undergoing therapy or of the communications made therein could
7
have disastrous repercussions upon his reputation and status. '
There is, however, a paucity of evidence indicating that these
adverse consequences would, in fact, occur. Treatment by psychiatrists and psychologists doe's not appear to have been hindered in
those states where a psychotherapist-patient testimonial privilege
has not been recognized. 72 Quite the contrary, as the court pointed
out in Lifschutz, "the practice of psychotherapy has grown, indeed
73
flourished, in an environment of a non-absolute privilege.
Recent trends in therapy would also appear to undermine the
psychotherapists' argument. Those asserting the essentiality of
complete confidentiality generally presuppose a "dyadic relationship," with the patient and therapist, meeting over a period of
time, forming a relationship of trust.7 4 Today, however, with
treatment frequently being conducted at clinics and local centers, it
is not unusual for the patient to encounter a number of therapists
during the course of his treatment. 75 Moreover, group therapy, a
mode of treatment conducted within an atmosphere of lesser
confidentiality, 76 is becoming increasingly widespread. 77 The comLawyer and Other Professionals:Its Implicationsforthe PrivilegedCommunications Doctrine, 71 YALE
L.J. 1226, 1255 (1962).
71 Slovenko, supra note 63, at 654; Slovenko, supra note 51, at 185. See also Note, supra
note 60, at 1179.
72 Fleming & Maximov, supra note 66, at 1060; Comment, supra note 70, at 1255.
11 2 Cal. 3d at 426, 467 P.2d at 564, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 836. It must be remembered that
psychotherapists, even absent a duty to warn, cannot guarantee confidentiality. For example,
some states recognize no testimonial privilege covering the communications between
psychotherapist and patient. Slawson, supra note 60, at 348-49. Even those states which do
have statutes covering this relationship do not provide an absolute protection. See, e.g., CAL.
EvID. CODE §§ 1016, 1024 (West 1966).
Traditionally "the public, legislatures, and courts have acted in reliance upon statements of therapists which indicate that treatment can in fact change behavior." Schwitzgebel,
The Right to Effective Mental Treatment, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 936, 948 (1974). However, there is a
disturbing quantum of evidence suggesting that, at least as traditionally practiced, it is
ineffective in improving patient behavior. See Eysenck, The Effects of Psychotherapy, I INT'L J.
PSYCHIATRY 97, 135-36 (1965); Schwitzgebel, supra at 941-48. What success is achieved seems
to be more the result of a chance affinity between patient and therapist rather than any
particular mode of treatment. Slovenko, supra note 63, at 665. Thus, therapeutic effectiveness, questionable at best, should not be substantially diminished by the requirement of
disclosure.
74 Slovenko, supra note 63, at 663.
I- Id. Furthermore, it is not unusual for therapists to enter into pre-treatment agreements with their patients, limiting the degree of confidentiality within which treatment will
take place. Fleming & Maximov, supra note 66, at 1041.
7' Fleming & Maximov, supra note 66, at 1042. Group therapy entails "simultaneous
treatment for a number of patients" in which the "interactions between patient and therapist
or among the patients themselves [are used] for exposing and solving problems confronting
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bined significance of these factors is to diminish the persuasiveness
of the view that a patient's self-disclosure and thus effective treatment will be inhibited by the inability to assure total confidentiality.
There is, however, a more fundamental interest which may
militate against the imposition of a duty toward third parties, and
that is the right to privacy of the individual patient. 7r A party
enters therapy with an expectation that confidentiality will be maintained. 7 9 Precisely because disclosure, even of the fact that one is
undergoing mental treatment, could do irreparable damage, the
patient's interest in privacy is substantial and deserving of protection.8 0 Moreover, this right to privacy has been recognized as
having "constitutional underpinnings."' 8' The United States Sureme Court, in Griswold v. Connecticut,82 recognized the fundamental nature of the right of privacy within the context of the marital
relationship. 83 In In re Lifschutz, the California supreme court, by
way of dicta, indicated that the psychotherapist-patient relationship
fell within Griswold's broad principles and that the patient's privacy
interest "draws sustenance from our constitutional heritage. "84
Recognition that a right has constitutional dimensions does
not, however, preclude all state interference, but rather delimits
such interference to those areas in which the state's interest is
compelling.8 5 Noting this, the Lifschutz court held that the state's
interest in arriving at the truth in legal proceedings was sufficiently
substantial to justify some intrusion upon the patient's right to
privacy.8 6 Clearly the state's interest in the safety of its citizens is as
members of the group." Id. at 1041-42 (footnote omitted). For a general discussion of this
mode of treatment see Cross, supra note 60.
77 Slovenko, supra note 63, at 663.
78 The important stake which the patient undergoing therapy has in the maintenance
of privacy can be gleaned from a recognition of the nature of the information disclosed:
[Tihere is hardly any situation in the gamut of human relations where one human
being is so much subject to the scrutiny and mercy of another human being as in
the psychodiagnostic and psychotherapeutic relationships. Implicit in the nature
and processes of psychodiagnosis and psychotherapy is a profound prying into the
most hidden aspects of personality and character, a prying often productive of
disclosure of secrets theretofore unknown even to the conscious mind of the patient
himself.
Louisell, supra note 60, at 745 (footnote omitted).
11 See M. GUTTMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 271 (1952); Fox,
Professional Confidences and the Psychologist, 3 TASMANIA U.L. REV. 12, 13 (1968).
80 See Fleming & Maximov, supra note 66, at 1050-51.
s' Inre Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 432, 467 P.2d 557, 568, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 840 (1970).
82 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
83 Id. at 485-86.
84 2 Cal. 3d at 431, 467 P.2d at 567, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 839. For an extended discussion of
Lifschutz see Note, Psychotherapy and the Law, 3 CONN. L. REV. 599 (1971).
15 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
8 2 Cal. 3d at 432-33, 467 P.2d at 568, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
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compelling as that of obtaining facts during litigation. Support for
this view can be derived from the operation of emergency commitment statutes, extant in virtually every state, which provide for the
detention of persons deemed dangerous to others."7 If a state's
interest in protecting its citizens is sufficient to overcome a patient's
right to liberty upon a determination that he is dangerous, certainly a
patient's right to privacy should likewise yield once a similar determination is made.
In contradistinction to the rights of the patient are those of the
potential victim, who has an important interest in remaining free
from physical harm.8 8 This interest is gaining increasing recognition as the level of violence within our society continues to soar. 9
Even many of those who most vehemently support the enactment
of strong psychotherapist-patient privilege statutes recognize that
where there is danger of harm to innocent third parties the need
for strict confidentiality is outweighed. 90
Recent legislative trends buttress the view that the rights of
innocent victims should be a paramount consideration. For example, the Uniform Rules of Evidence except from testimonial
privilege communications made to a physician where the service
was sought "to enable or aid [the patient] to commit or to plan to
commit a crime or a tort." 91 Additionally, a number of states are
92
establishing programs to compensate victims of violent crime.
87

Fleming & Maximov, supra note 66, at 1052; Note, supra note 60, at 1184. For

example, the California emergency commitment statute provides for a 72-hour confinement
for evaluation and treatment of persons considered dangerous either to themselves or to
others. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5150 (West Supp. 1975).
88 One commentator has recently observed:
As a citizen, most of the rights guaranteed me under the Bill of Rights become
nugatory if I am hopelessly crippled by violence, and all of them become extinguished if I am killed.
Hook, The Emerging Rights of the Victims of Crime, 46 FLA. B.J. 192, 193 (1972). He therefore
suggested that a greater emphasis should be placed upon the attainment of societal security
even if the cost is a certain degree of curtailment of the rights of individuals. Id. at 194.
89 Between 1960 and 1970, violent crime, which is "limited to murder, forcible rape,
robbery and aggravated assault," rose by 156 percent in the United States. 1970 FBI
UNIFORM CRIME REP. 3.
90 See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 59, at 633; Slovenko, supra note 51, at 197-98; Note, supra
note 60, at 1182.
91 UNIFORM R. EVID. 27(6).
92 California established a program to compensate victims of violent crime in 1965. Act
of July 16, 1965, ch. 1549, [1965] Cal. Stat. 3641 (repealed 1967). The program in its
present form was enacted in 1967. Act of August 30, 1967, ch. 1546, [1967] Cal. Stat. 3707
(codified at CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13959 et seq. (West Supp. 1975)). It has since been criticized
as being "ineffective and unresponsive." Younger, Commendable Words: A CriticalEvaluation of
California's Victim Compensation Law, 7 J. BEVERLY HILLS B. ASS'N 12, 16 (March-April 1973).
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Furthermore, emergency commitment statutes, expressly designed
to prevent harm to potential victims, 93 demonstrate a subordination of the patient's interests to those of society. And, as the
majority in Tarasoff correctly pointed out, California's "'dangerous
patient' exception" to the psychotherapist-patient testimonial
privilege can be viewed as evidencing a legislative determination
that, as between the potential victim and the patient, the interests
94
of the former should take precedence.
Society has a genuine interest in promoting effective
therapy,95 and confidentiality may play a key role in the achievement of this objective. However, the imposition of a duty to warn
in instances where danger to innocent third parties is imminent is
not likely to undermine this goal.9 6 Of more alarming consequence
is the fact that fundamental rights of the patients undergoing
therapy may be abridged. Yet, where fundamental interests of disparate groups are not coterminous, this result is inevitable, and
the correctness of the balance struck must be viewed in terms of its
97
consequences for society as a whole.
The evaluation of the social importance of one policy as opposed to another is, ultimately, a value judgment, the sagacity of
which can only be determined with the passage of time. However,
given our present level of violence, the decision to impose a duty to
warn where there exists foreseeable danger to innocent parties
appears to be a correct one. As the Tarasoff majority emphasized, "we
Following California's initiative, a number of states have established programs which provide
financial aid, in varying degrees, to victims of crime. See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 351-1 et
seq. (1968), as amended, (Supp. 1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26A, § 1 et seq. (1974), as amended,
(Supp. 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-1 etseq. (Supp. 1975-76); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 620etseq., at
529 (McKinney 1972), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1974-75). For a general discussion of the
social consequences of victim compensation see Mueller, Compensation for Victims of Crime:
Thought Before Action, 50 MINN. L. REv. 213 (1965).
93 Fleming & Maximov, supra note 66, at 1052. For a discussion of the probable effects
that the imposition upon a psychiatrist of the duty to warn will have on emergency commitments see Note, supra note 60, at 1185.
94 13 Cal. 3d at n.ll, 529 P.2d at 561, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 137 (quoting from
Fleming & Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's Dilemma, 62 CALIF. L. REV.
1025, 1063 (1974)).
95 Love & Yanity, supra note 69, at 424. The societal importance of effective treatment
of the mentally ill was underscored in Binder v. Ruvell, No. 52C2535 (Ill. Cir. Ct., June 24,
1952), reprinted in 150 J.A.M.A. 1241 (1952), in which the court characterized psychiatry as
"a healing process affecting thousands and perhaps millions of our inhabitants." Id. at 1242.
See also 2 Cal. 3d at 421-22, 467 P.2d at 560, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
" See notes 72-77 supra and accompanying text.
9' As articulated by Justice Cardozo, "[tihe final cause of law is the welfare of society."
B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PRocEss 66 (1921).
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can hardly tolerate the further exposure to danger that would result
from a concealed knowledge of the therapist that his patient was
lethal "198
Joseph J. Malcolm
98

-

Cal. 3d at -

, 529 P.2d at 561, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 137.

